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This paper1 aims to contribute to the debate revolving around the relevance of ontological 
projects in the philosophy of the social sciences (POSS). More precisely, the paper is an 
attempt to respond to those neo-pragmatist philosophers who contest the usefulness of 
ontological investigations for the social sciences tout court and, hence, propose that we should 
stop pursuing ontological projects in POSS in favour of epistemological and methodological 
investigations (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006, 2007; Van Bouwel and Weber 2008; Tsilipakos 
2012).2 My goal here is to defend the view that ontological investigations of a certain kind can 
indeed be relevant for the social sciences. 
 Note, that a concern for the relevance of ontological projects in POSS for the social 
sciences cannot be taken for granted. The reason for this is that there are several different 
aims an ontologically-minded philosopher of the social sciences (or any of the special 
sciences) might have. Some philosophers of the social sciences might primarily be concerned 
with developing their own theory of social reality. As part of such an enterprise they might be 
interested in the social sciences only to serve as contrast or springboard for developing an 
independent social theory that is supposed to make sense of social reality. Other philosophers 
might be aiming at naturalizing metaphysics, i.e. pursuing some kind of scientifically informed 
metaphysics that attempts to paint an accurate overall picture of the world – in our case the 
social world – that is compatible with, constrained by or based on the current state of the art of 
our best social sciences. This seems to be a sensible project in the philosophy of the natural 
sciences (Ladyman et al. 2007) and it would be a legitimate – though, at the current state of 
the social sciences, hardly achievable – project in the philosophy of the social sciences. 
Neither of these two projects is meant, at least not in a straightforward sense, to be relevant for 
the social sciences in the first place. Projects such as these, therefore, do not fall within the 
                                         
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, Jeroen Van Bouwel (Ghent), Paul Hoyningen-Huene (Zurich/ 
Hannover), Nicolas Wüthrich (London), audiences at ENPOSS 2014 and CLMPS 2015 as well as the participants of 
the research seminar in philosophy (summer term 2015) at the Leibniz Universität Hannover for helpful comments 
on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to Lucie White (Hannover) for correcting and improving my English. 
2 There are other neo-pragmatist philosophies of the social sciences, which I do not address in this paper, e.g. Baert 
2005. 
To appear in Philosophy of the Social Sciences   |   Revised draft, 2016-05-25 – please do not cite! 
 
 3 
scope of this paper.3 My aim is rather to develop some meta-ontological thoughts, which focus 
on ontological investigations in POSS that are indeed meant to be useful for the social 
sciences. I attempt to flesh out a position that is, I believe, latent in many naturalist approaches 
to the philosophy of the social sciences and that implies a reorientation of ontological projects 
in POSS. In a nutshell, I want to show that the practice turn in philosophy of science would also 
be fruitful for doing ontology in the philosophy of the social sciences.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. After some clarifying remarks on my terminology 
(part 2), I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological 
investigations for the social sciences respectively, namely ontological foundationalism and anti-
ontological pragmatism (part 3). I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent 
part (4) of the paper will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in POSS that fares 
better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social 
scientific theories, models and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this 
alternative through discussion of three concrete cases. In the conclusion (part 5) I will wrap up 
the main points of my discussion. 
2 Terminological Clarifications 
Before I begin with the discussion, there are two clarifying remarks about my terminology in 
order. The first remark concerns my use of the term ‘social sciences’. For the purpose of this 
paper, I primarily want to subsume sociology, cultural anthropology and political science under 
this label. My intention here is not to say that economics is not really a social science (I think it 
is). However, there are significant differences between economics and the other social 
sciences, which necessitate this separation. Here are three main differences. (1) Economics 
                                         
3 This limitation of the paper should not be read as a dismissal of philosophies of the social sciences that do not aim 
at being relevant or useful for the social sciences in a direct sense. In fact, I do not believe that the legitimacy of any 
philosophy of a special science is determined by its relevance for the respective special science. It seems to be a 
perfectly reasonable project of any philosophy of the special sciences to try to understand special science S and 
make sense of the picture of the world S provides from a philosophical point of view – without the motivation to 
criticise or advance S. The critique and advancement of a special science, though an important enterprise, is just 
one of the reasonable aims a philosopher of a special science can have. 
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has a leading, although not completely uncontested (see Davis 2006), paradigm4, namely the 
neoclassical synthesis while the other social sciences are extremely multi-paradigmatic. (2) 
Economics features a higher degree of formalization and mathematization than the other social 
sciences (Debreu 1991). (3) Large parts of economics place a huge role on predictions of 
social – especially economic – events and processes. Friedman (2008[1953], 148) even called 
it the ultimate goal of economics as a positive science (see, however, Reiss 2013: 8ff for a 
broader perspective). The other social sciences, in contrast, are far less interested in 
predictions. They aim to a greater degree at explaining and thereby understanding social 
phenomena. These and related aspects also seem to be the reason for the existence of a 
distinctive disciplinary identity in economics and the existence of a separate sub-philosophy of 
economics with its own journals (e.g. Economics & Philosophy), discourses (Hausman 2008) 
and post-graduate degrees. 
The second remark concerns my use of the phrase ‘ontological investigations’ (I will also use 
the terms ‘ontological reasoning’ or ‘doing ontology’, which I take to be synonyms in this 
context). What do I mean by these terms in the context of the social sciences? I thereby mean 
thinking or reflecting about questions such as these:   
- What is the ultimate furniture of the social world? 
- What are the general properties of social phenomena such as organisations or religions? 
(e.g. causal efficacy) 
- What is their mode of existence? (e.g. are they real and autonomous in some sense; real and 
ontologically dependent in some sense; mere fictions?)  
- How are facts about ‘the social’ (e.g. universities) and ‘the individual’ (e.g. individual actions) 
related? 
                                         
4 I use the term ‘paradigm’ not in Kuhn's but in a broader sense, roughly meaning ‘explanatory framework’ (e.g. 
Analytical Marxism, Practice Theory), since many paradigms in the social sciences do not seem to exhibit one of the 
key features of Kuhnian paradigms, namely to be exemplary solutions to prominent research problems (Hoyningen-
Huene and Lohse 2015, 136). 
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- How is social reality, in general, related to other aspects of reality? 
- Are there layers or levels of social reality – say micro-, meso- and macro-level – and, if so, 
how are they related? 
In short, I subsume both investigations concerned with question of what there is (‘furniture 
questions’) in the social world and projects aiming at the nature and relations of the things 
there are under this label. I take it that this broad understanding of ontology is fairly 
uncontroversial within POSS (see Epstein 2015a). My aim in this paper, however, is not to 
answer any of those questions but to look at two opposed assessments of the relevance of 
these questions for the social sciences and to present an argument that may further a 
reorientation, i.e. a more fruitful way of engaging with questions like these in POSS. In the 
course of this, I will frequently refer to the individualism/holism disputes for illustrative purposes 
as they are central to many debates in social ontology (see Zahle and Collin 2014). 
3 Two Prominent Views 
There are two prominent views on the relevance of doing ontology in contemporary POSS. 
First, there are those who think that ontological investigations play a central role for the social 
sciences as they are the foundation for the explanation of social phenomena, social regularities 
and the effects that social phenomena have on individual behaviour. I call this view ontological 
foundationalism. Advocates of ontological foundationalism often argue that ontological issues 
in the social sciences have not received enough attention in the past and that, therefore, we 
need more serious thinking about social ontology to arrive at a solid foundation for the social 
sciences. The second camp thinks that ontological investigations are irrelevant or fruitless for 
explanations in the social sciences: I call this view anti-ontological pragmatism. Advocates of 
anti-ontological pragmatism typically argue that ontological issues in the social sciences have 
received too much attention in the past and that we need less (or no) thinking about social 
ontology in philosophy of the social sciences. Instead, philosophers of the social sciences 
should focus their efforts more exclusively on epistemological and methodological work. 
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3.1 Ontological Foundationalism: “Ontology first!” 
Who endorses ontological foundationalism? Naturally, some philosophers in social ontology 
have argued explicitly for the importance of doing ontology for the social sciences. In a paper 
from 2008 Searle5, one of the godfathers of modern social ontology, says: 
I believe that where the social sciences are concerned, social ontology is 
prior to methodology and theory. It is prior in the sense that unless you have 
a clear conception of the nature of the phenomena you are investigating, you 
are unlikely to develop the right methodology and the right theoretical 
apparatus for conducting the investigation (Searle 2008, 443f emphasis 
mine). 
Searle is not very explicit about the exact relationship between ontology and methodology / the 
development of theoretical tools for the investigation of social reality here (or anywhere else). 
In a closing passage in Making the Social World he even admits that he does not really know 
what the implications of his theory for research in the social sciences are (Searle 2010, 200). It 
seems to be clear, however, that Searle’s general outlook is that the development of theories 
and explanatory tools in the social sciences somehow should depend on ontological 
foundations as “the whole investigation gets a greater depth if one is acutely conscious of the 
ontology of the phenomena being investigated” (ibid., 201). 
Still, these statements by Searle are quite abstract. Looking at the individualism/holism debate 
in POSS, matters become more concrete. Consider Keith Sawyer´s writings in POSS. Sawyer 
(2002; 2003; 2005) aims at developing a position he calls ‘non-reductive individualism’, by 
analogy to one of the mainstream positions in philosophy of mind: non-reductive materialism. 
He draws from well-known concepts in the philosophy of mind debate, above all supervenience 
                                         
5 Objection: “Why Searle? Is he really a philosopher of the social sciences. Searle does not engage with the social 
scientific literature and he is barely cited in sociological discourse.” I agree but I think he should be included 
nevertheless. For one, he is widely recognized as a an important participant in the ontological discourse in POSS 
(Guala 2007; Mantzavinos 2009). In addition, Searle (1995; 2010) explicitly aims, among other things, at improving 
the social sciences by providing a general picture of the ontological foundations of social reality. 
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and multiple realizability, to argue for a middle ground position in POSS between strong holism 
and individualism. This position is supposed “to provide a philosophical argument to ground 
collectivist macrosociology” (Sawyer 2002, 539). At first glance, Sawyer does not seem to be 
an ontological foundationalist at all as he aims to avoid “the logical error of making ontological 
arguments in support of methodological claims” (ibid., 538). If you look at his philosophical 
strategy it becomes clear, however, that the core of his argument actually presupposes that 
we, first, need to get the ontology right and can then draw conclusions from this concerning 
social explanations. As a matter of fact, Sawyer seems to follow Durkheim (1964[1895]) in 
thinking that it is necessary to show that certain social phenomena really have emergent 
causal powers to argue for the indispensability of holistic explanations in sociology. Apparently, 
many philosophers of the social sciences arguing for some kind of holism think that a variation 
of Sawyer’s ‘ontological argument’ is plausible. The main idea of this argument is that holist 
explanations are only informative and legitimate if it can be shown that social entities have real 
causal powers, or some kind of ontological status sui generis, despite the fact that they 
supervene on individuals and their interactions (see the papers by Zahle 2003 and Van Bouwel 
2004 for details). 
Critical Realists in the tradition of Roy Bhaskar defending an emergentist ontology (such as 
Margaret Archer and Dave Elder-Vass) to argue against methodological individualism seem to 
have similar things in mind. In his book The Causal Power of Social Structures (2010) Elder-
Vass develops a position that “recognises the contributions of both social structure and human 
agency to explaining social events, and also the complexity of the interactions between them. It 
is therefore distinct from methodological individualist positions, which deny causal 
effectiveness to social structure […]” (Elder-Vass 2010, 8). According to this theory, social 
groups, in Elder-Vass’ terminology ‘norm circles’, and organizations can exert genuine causal 
powers, most notably by producing and endorsing social norms, which only then become a 
part of social reality or ‘culture’. This relational theory of social emergence is (arguably) in 
contrast to an individualist ontology and is also used to show the deficiency of individualist 
explanations in the social sciences. Once again, ontological arguments are considered to be 
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foundational for explanatory practices in the social sciences, in this instance, as an ontological 
ground for rejecting methodological individualist explanations (ibid., 196). 
On the other end of the individualism/holism-spectrum we have, for example, proponents of 
Analytical Sociology who endorse ontological foundationalism in a straightforward way. Pierre 
Demeulenaere (2011, 4) expresses this view in this way: “Social life exists only by virtue of 
actors who live it.” From this ontological premise follows immediately a methodological 
postulate. “Consequently, a social fact of any kind must be explained by direct reference to the 
actions of its constituents [individual actors]” (my emphasis). Needless to say, John Watkins 
(1952; 1957) and Daniel Little (1998, 10) have expressed similar arguments: the requirement 
of individualist explanations follows directly – and naturally – from ontological individualism. 
At first glance, Daniel Little’s most recent position in this debate seems not entirely clear.6 On 
the one hand he argues that a plurality of approaches in the social is needed and legitimate. 
On the other hand he develops his own kind of social ontology and says: 
I believe that the social sciences need to be framed out of consideration of a 
better understanding of the nature of the social – a better social ontology 
(Little 2009, 174). 
Little even makes methodological recommendations regarding the best kinds of explanations – 
namely, causal mechanistic explanations (ibid.) – that are at least partly motivated by his 
‘localist’ social ontology. Does he also exclude certain types of explanations on ontological 
grounds? I think he does. I believe the most plausible interpretation of his position is that Little 
endorses a plurality of explanatory approaches in the social sciences – albeit constrained by 
his (more or less) individualist social ontology: 
If our social ontology maintains that complex social processes and 
assemblages take shape out of the actions and thoughts of individuals, then 
it is logical that we need to develop a theory of the actor. This does not imply 
                                         
6 ‚Most recent’ as Little has moved away from his earlier strong micro-foundationalist position in recent papers.  
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that our explanations always need to proceed from individual level to social 
level; sometimes this is an appropriate explanatory strategy and sometimes it 
is not. But even in circumstances where our explanations include hypotheses 
that refer to social entities, we still need to have some idea of the kinds of 
actions and interactions [of individuals] that establish the properties of those 
entities (Little 2014, 57 my emphasis). 
In my view, this makes him a mild ontological foundationalist aiming to reject what could be 
called ‘pure holist explanations’, i.e. explanations referring to social entities without any kind of 
in-principle micro-foundations of these entities, for ontological reasons. 
Note, that the basic rationale in both the individualist and the holist arguments is the same: 
Ontology comes first and has important consequences for the social sciences, particularly for 
the choice of individualist or holist explanations. If (for example) entities on the macro-level 
(whatever this is exactly) are only composed of individuals, their properties and relations and if 
(say) strong social emergentism does not hold we do not need holist explanations, or purely 
holist explanations are not gold standard respectively. If not, holist explanations are 
indispensable or gold standard. The main difference is that, in many cases, the individualist 
camp assumes the individualist ontology´s truth as self-evident or trivial (Watkins 1952) - it only 
needs to be elucidated a bit to avoid confusion - while holists typically expend more ontological 
effort to justify their position and draw on arguments from philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
biology or general philosophy of science. 
What is the motivation behind ontological foundationalism? Three of the main (and interrelated) 
reasons for advocating this position are the following:  
First, there is a certain realist intuition about theories and explanations in the social sciences, 
i.e. good social theories and explanations simply have to picture or map the existing entities 
and dependency relations by and large to be explanatory and, hence, are determined in an 
important sense by the structure of the social world. Therefore, you (allegedly) need to have a 
plausible ontology first that tells you something about the general nature of the entities and 
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their properties and causal capacities in a certain domain; only then you can start investigating 
its details (see Hay 2006 for a similar argument). If there are macro entities sui generis – use 
theories and explanations referring to these entities; or, if the locus of causality is on the micro-
level – use micro-explanations, and so on. 
Second, there are deep concerns regarding the epistemic status and the scientific 
achievements of the social sciences, especially in contrast to the explanatory adequacy (and 
predictive power) of the natural sciences. In light of these concerns, some philosophers of the 
social sciences seem to think that social scientists would benefit from a firm ontological basis, 
provided by philosophers, as a starting point for better explanatory practices (e.g. Little 2010, 
298f; see also Epstein 2015b, 7, 40f). 
Third, it might be possible to reduce pluralism in the social sciences via ontological 
investigations. Many philosophers of the social sciences feel that the current pluralist state of 
the disciplines, namely the vast plurality of different theories and forms of explanations in the 
social sciences, is a deficiency of the social sciences inhibiting the development of the 
disciplines. There exists no common groundwork allowing for the accumulation of social 
scientific knowledge. Rather, the social sciences supposedly exist in a state of pre-normal 
science (Kuhn 1970, Chap. 2), which means, among other things, that there is no shared 
research focus but competition between rival schools and explanatory frameworks leading to 
very different interpretations of the same phenomena. Ontology-based recommendations or 
restrictions for theories and explanations can be considered the foundationalists’ remedy for 
this situation: Ontological foundations might lead to the best or only kind(s) of explanatory 
frameworks in the social sciences, thereby alleviating pluralism. 
Now, there are many arguments against certain forms of doing ontology in the context of the 
social sciences. For example, many believe that social ontology in the Gilbert-Searle-Tuomela-
tradition is too self-contained and too isolated from the (theoretical) discourse in the social 
sciences to be of any real use for the social sciences (e.g. Kincaid 2012). In addition, there has 
been scepticism towards transferring ontological arguments from philosophy of mind to the 
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philosophy of the social sciences (Greshoff 2011). However, in the recent literature, a more 
radical opposition has emerged against the relevance of ontological investigations for the 
social sciences. 
3.2 Anti-Ontological Pragmatism: “Leave ontology behind!” 
Who supports this more radical opposition and considers ontological projects in POSS in toto 
as (at least mostly) irrelevant or fruitless for the social sciences? That is, who holds anti-
ontological pragmatism? 
First of all, this position is widespread amongst social scientists who focus on empirical 
research and have a kind of hands-on attitude towards doing social science. Many (though not 
all) sociologists who exclusively do empirical research share a dismissive attitude towards the 
relevance of ontological investigations as a foundation for their research (if not all philosophy of 
the social sciences). This might only be a prevalent prejudice of course. Recently, however, the 
sociologists Kivinen & Piiroinen have developed an actual argument along these lines: 
Rather than revealing the structure of reality or the necessary conditions of 
scientific inquiries, they [ontological theories about the world] only reveal their 
holders’ a priori metaphysical positions. To pretend that those positions 
somehow offer necessary groundings for research leads all too often into 
nothing but vicious circles, into unending battles of intuitions, at the expense 
of methodologically fruitful debates that might result in improving our social 
scientific practices (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006, 310). 
Instead the authors argue for “concentrating more exclusively on methodological issues, 
dropping metaphysical conjectures altogether, and replacing them with operationalizable 
research questions” (ibid.: 312). 
Kivinen & Piiroinen cite Van Bouwel who has defended a similar (but more moderate) position 
in the philosophy of the social sciences. Van Bouwel (2004, 534) makes a plea for “giving less 
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weight to metaphysical and ontological debates […] to maximize (our understanding of) good 
scientific practice.” He explicitly questions the foundationalist base assumption in most 
individualism/holism disputes and states that it should be our explanatory request, rather than 
ontological assumptions about the social world, that should determine the right level 
(individualist/holist) of explanation. Following up on this, Van Bouwel and Weber (2008) defend 
a pragmatist de-ontologized approach to social explanation which focuses on epistemic 
interests as a guiding principle for explanatory choice and attempts to “leave the more 
ontological and conceptual analysis of explanation (with the evidence being our intuitions) 
behind“ (p. 439). The key idea of their approach is to, first, make the explanda and the 
connected explanation-seeking questions of a certain research endeavour in the social 
sciences as explicit as possible. In a second step, the thereby determined epistemic interest is 
used as a standard for choosing the best explanatory framework for this research endeavour. 
My final example of the anti-ontological stance is a paper with the title The Poverty of 
Ontological Reasoning. In this paper, Tsilipakos argues against the view “that one requires an 
ontology on which to ground one’s methodology and empirical investigations“ (2012, 215). 
Tsilipakos is extremely sceptical towards recent attempts to ‘ontologize’ the debates revolving 
around individualism/holism and different explanatory frameworks in POSS. He even attempts 
to show, following Wittgenstein, that ontological investigations in POSS are deeply misguided 
and cannot add anything but confusion to contemporary debates as they misconceive the role 
of language in ontology (see also Tsilipakos 2015). 
What is the motivation behind anti-ontological pragmatism? There seem to be a number of 
reasons for defending this position. Here, I will only discuss three of the most important ones: 
First, some authors think the prioritisation of ontological investigations is slowing down or 
obstructing real progress in the philosophy of the social sciences. There are many ontological 
disputes going on in POSS (e.g. individualism vs. emergentism; naturalism vs. 
interpretationism; collectivism vs. singularism). These disputes appear to be never-ending – 
thereby tying up resources – for several reasons: For one thing, some argue, many ontological 
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disputes are just undecidable for epistemic reasons: In many cases it just seems to be unclear 
what kind of reason would be sufficient to show that one of the disputants is right. This seems 
to be so, since people on both sides of a dispute typically agree on the data and the examples 
used to argue for position A or B. They only disagree about the right ontological theory to 
describe the data and the examples; and they disagree about the grounds for preferring one 
ontological theory over the other (see Bennett 2009 for the analogue problem in analytic 
metaphysics), especially about their metaphysical intuitions (which, sometimes, seem to be the 
only grounds there are). In other cases, the putatively deep ontological disputes appear to be 
nothing more than persistent verbal disputes. The debate revolving around Elder-Vass concept 
of relational emergence and his ‘redescription principle’ may be a case in point here (Elder-
Vass 2010; Elder-Vass 2014; Wahlberg 2014). Thus, the pragmatists argue, we should leave 
ontology behind and focus on explanatory and methodological issues in the social sciences. 
A second reason is the rejection of the realist intuition (see above) concerning theories and 
explanations. Let´s suppose we reach a consensus in ontological matters: According to the 
pragmatists, sensible social theories and explanation still do not necessarily have to picture the 
structure of the social world or be derived from ontological premises to be good theories and 
explanations. It is rather the epistemic interest (what do we want to know?) of the researchers 
and pragmatic aspects (e.g. efficiency or simplicity) that should guide the choice of 
explanations and methodological tools.  
To use an example by List and Spiekermann (2013, 640), the democratic peace hypothesis 
states that democratic states do not engage in wars against other democratic states. A 
canonical explanation of this regularity relies on structural macro-features of democracies 
(such as: the complexity of decision procedures in democratic states and other institutional 
constrains). Now, let us assume that ontological individualism is right, i.e. democracies are 
completely determined by individuals, their beliefs, their actions and so on: why would we – 
following ontological foundationalism – need additional and extremely complex information 
about these individual-level details (interactions of politicians, concrete election outcomes etc.) 
To appear in Philosophy of the Social Sciences   |   Revised draft, 2016-05-25 – please do not cite! 
 
 14 
of the institutional processes within democratic states in this case? The structural explanation 
on the level of states seems to be quite rigorous (i.a. due to statistical control for spurious 
correlations and confounding variables), it is efficient, and it is illuminating as it provides 
adequate explanatory information in relation to our epistemic interest (reflected in the research 
question: Why do democracies not engage in armed conflict with each other while they do fight 
wars with non-democratic states?). If, on the other hand, we wanted to know how democracy X 
implemented a certain institutional design (this is a different epistemic interest), the individual 
level details would certainly provide essential information. Thus, the anti-ontological 
pragmatists argue, the main ground for the choice of theories and explanations in the social 
sciences should be the instrumentality for our epistemic interests – and not ontological 
reasoning. 
Third, and as a consequence of the second point, pragmatists do not see pluralism as a 
deficiency of the social sciences: We just need different explanatory tools and theoretical 
perspectives for different research questions and, therefore, should embrace pluralism as the 
proliferation of different perspectives on the world instead of striving to eliminate it. 
Particularly the latter two reasons for anti-ontological pragmatism are convincing. They show 
that ontological foundationalism rests on an ‘ontological fallacy’. It is – for epistemic reasons – 
just not very persuasive that theories and explanations have to reproduce and are determined 
by the ontology of the social world. Whether a mechanistic, evolutionary, individualist or holist 
explanation is preferable indeed depends on our epistemic interest (what do we want to 
know?) and pragmatic aspects such as efficiency. The respective type of explanation only has 
to make a course of social action intelligible (using accepted methodological standards of 
social research) or ‘latch on’ to some actual pattern in the social world to have the potential to 
be a successful explanation (see van Fraassen 1980: 40 for the same point in general 
philosophy of science). Therefore, pluralism of theories and explanations does not seem to be 
a bad thing. And this should not be a surprise: the social sciences are not the only disciplines 
with considerable theoretical and explanatory pluralism. If you look, for example, at the thriving 
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biological sciences and psychology, they appear to be quite pluralist (see Kellert, Longino, and 
Waters 2006 for more examples of pluralistic sciences). Hence, it seems unclear why 
explanatory pluralism should be a problem for the social sciences in the first place. 
So, what about the first reason then; do we have to dismiss ontological investigations as they 
are undecidable and obstructing progress in POSS? Or is there a role to play for ontological 
investigations for the social sciences after all? The short answer is: it depends on the way of 
pursuing ontological questions. 
4 Another Role for Ontology in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences 
No philosophical ontology of the social sphere determines theories and explanations in the 
social sciences (nor should it). I agree, and so do many if not most social scientists. Hardly 
anybody in the social sciences seems to be interested in ontological foundations as outlined 
and, at least to my knowledge, no social scientist has attempted to ground a new or better 
social science upon philosophical foundations. This is, of course, in part due to sociological 
factors such as separated disciplinary discourses and the sometimes uneasy relationship 
between philosophers and social scientists. I believe, however, that there is also a reasonable 
epistemic reason for this situation. In fact, ontological foundationalism appears to be a rather 
strange position if you look at it from a more general philosophy of science perspective. Why 
should a philosophical ontology determine scientific research in the first place? Contrast this 
with any philosophy of the natural sciences: It would be absurd to argue for the analogue 
position in (say) the philosophy of biology or the philosophy of chemistry. So, why is it 
supposed to be a viable position in POSS? 
However, this assessment does not mean that we have to de-ontologize all of POSS and 
make a case for an entirely pragmatic-methodological approach, which exclusively focuses on 
different types of explanations and epistemic interests of social scientists (Van Bouwel and 
Weber 2008; Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006). In fact, ontological investigations of a certain kind 
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can indeed be relevant for the social sciences. I will elucidate this statement in the following 
section. 
The pragmatists’ dismissal of ontology as a whole rests on an excessively narrow 
understanding of what ontological investigations are and what their purpose in the context of 
the social sciences could be. They (and, likewise, foundationalists) presuppose that ontological 
reasoning is tantamount to conceptual reasoning, relying mainly on the philosophers’ intuitions 
and preconceptions of reality. As a matter of fact, however, there is a well-established 
alternative understanding of what ontological investigations can be; namely the investigation of 
explicit and implicit ontological assumptions of theories and explanatory frameworks, that is, 
the investigation of the ontological demands on the world presupposed by scientific theories, 
models and related explanatory practices. I want to endorse the view that “a serious study of 
science must be concerned with what it is that we actually do in scientific work“ (Chang 2014, 
67) and argue for the natural extension of this position (advocated by philosophers of science 
in practice) to the context of this paper. The ‘practice turn’ in philosophy of science (Soler et al. 
2014; Kendig 2016) also offers a fruitful perspective for understanding the place of ontology, 
and the purpose of doing ontology, in the philosophy of the social sciences. Understanding 
ontology in this way would mean a shift from ontological reasoning for the social sciences to 
ontological investigations of the social sciences, including not only social scientific theories but 
also their actual application within the disciplines as well as less theory-based explanatory 
practices. Until now – and somewhat surprisingly – this has only sporadically been done in 
POSS (see, however, Harold Kincaid’s work as an example).  
In suggesting that ontological investigations of the social sciences should extend beyond 
theories, I certainly do not mean to imply that theories are not important. They are an integral 
part of the social sciences, and theorizing as well as the application of theories is itself an 
epistemic activity (cf. Chang 2014: 67f). In other words, I take the practice turn not to be a turn 
away from theory but a turn towards the practical dimension of science, among other things. 
Please note, that this understanding of ontological reasoning is compatible with my earlier 
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characterization of ontological investigations, as all of the above-mentioned questions can be 
approached as questions about the ontological assumptions or commitments (broadly 
construed) of theories, explanatory frameworks and so on. 7 
There are a number of different roles that ontological investigations understood in this way 
could play for the social sciences. I will illustrate this with three examples. 
(1) Ontological investigations do not determine research in the social sciences. However, they 
can be used to examine and restrict ontological assumptions in light of the postulated 
explanatory approach. 
It is essential that entities used in social explanations have the properties needed to do the 
explanatory work they are meant to do (see Ludwig 2015 for a very illuminating discussion of 
the dependence of ontological choices on explanatory interests and scientific practice). If we 
look at existing social explanations, however, we can see that this is not always the case. For 
example, the organizational ecologists’ answer to the research question of why certain kinds of 
organizations survive better in different kinds of environments cites different organizational 
strategies as well as Darwinian selection mechanisms on the population level as important 
explanatory factors (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Reydon and 
Scholz (2009) criticise ecological explanations of this kind from an ontological point of view. 
According to them the organizational ecologists’ approach de facto lacks an evolutionary 
mechanism. The reason is that it specifies entities (“organizational populations”) which are not 
capable of evolving in a Darwinian sense. In other words, the explanatory core of this 
Darwinian research approach seems to be flawed as the relevant entities cannot fulfil the 
intended explanatory role for ontological reasons. 
In cases like this, ontological investigations in POSS have a normative function as they not 
only examine and clarify but also critically evaluate the ontological assumptions of social 
                                         
7  In the end, my view may also be compatible with the more moderate passages of Van Bouwel’s view: 
“[…] explanatory pluralism will still have to consider ontological issues in order to secure the compatibility and 
complementarity of theories and explanations“ (2004, 534; see also Van Bouwel 2014, 164, Fn. 9) – however, he 
does not really say much about this aspect. In the following part of this paper I attempt to do just this. 
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explanations in light of their explanatory function. The idea then, is not to generally exclude 
explanatory frameworks for a priori ontological reasons (e.g. the hermeneutic nature of human 
action), as that would be ontological foundationalism all over again, but to provide a contextual 
critique of ontological assumptions given the postulated explanatory approach and the 
epistemic goals of the research enterprise.8 This kind of ontological investigation is relevant for 
the social sciences as it is in close contact with explanatory practices and has the potential to 
advance the social sciences through accompanying critique.  
 
(2) Some forms of social explanations rely heavily on unclear or taken-for-granted ontological 
assumptions that can (and should) be made clear / explicit by ontological investigations. 
The social mechanism approach will be used to illustrate this point. The general idea of 
mechanistic explanations in the social sciences is to ‘open up the black box’. Mechanistic 
explanations explain certain social phenomena by describing their generative mechanism, i.e. 
the entities (often individuals) and causal processes that, given a specific arrangement of the 
entities and a certain context, produce the phenomena in question (Hedström and Swedberg 
1996; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Naturally, mechanistic explanations can be useful for 
many epistemic interests. 
Mechanistic approaches are heavily infused with ontological assumptions because they think 
that an (idealized) description of the actual mechanism in the real world ipso facto is an 
explanation of the phenomenon it produces. Having said this, there appears to be quite a lot of 
ontological mopping-up-work to do for philosophers of the social sciences. Here are two 
examples: 
(a) In some cases, it is not very clear what kinds of relations are supposed to exist between the 
entities in a social mechanism. At times, causal, intentional, constitutive and spacio-temporal 
relations as well as relations ‘via social actions’ are lumped together (often as arrows in a 
                                         
8 Many thanks to Thomas Reydon for helping me realize what I actually wanted to say here. 
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diagram), leaving a central part of the described mechanism sketchy or ill-defined (see, 
however, Little’s initial approach (2012, 147) as a useful starting point for spelling out different 
mechanistic relations in more detail). It would, therefore, seem worthwhile to take a closer look 
at concrete examples of mechanistic explanations (not only methodological texts about these 
explanations), to analyse the actual ontological assumptions of the explanations in question 
and to compare different mechanist explanations in this respect. (This could also be a 
contribution to a taxonomy of different kinds of social mechanisms.)  
Above all, it is not always clear how many levels of entities are supposed to exist and how the 
different levels of social reality relate to each other in the description of a social mechanism. In 
what way do macro-entities such as organizations depend on individuals? Are there genuine 
causal relations between macro-entities and micro-entities (individual agents) in mechanistic 
explanation X? Coleman´s famous micro-macro-model (“Coleman’s boat”) (1990), for example, 
seems to contain an ambiguity in relation to the question of whether there exists genuine 
downward causation, or only as-if downward causation or some kind of other (structural?) kind 
of determination relation between macro- and micro-level (Udehn 2001, 295ff). 9  Whichever 
option one endorses, it would be illuminating to really understand how these downward-
relations are meant to be made intelligible in mechanistic explanations with macro-entities 
typically being conceived as composed of the entities on the lower level (individuals). 
Answers to these questions would make descriptions of social mechanisms more 
explicit and thereby the respective mechanistic explanation more intelligible. As a side note, 
how these questions are answered is far from inconsequential from a practical point of view, 
since these topics are highly relevant for social practices informed by the social sciences: It just 
makes a difference whether social workers, politicians or business managers think there exists 
genuine structural or downward causation (say) in organizations – or not. The sense making of 
social situations depends on the interpretative resources of the involved agents. These 
interpretative resources, in turn, are influenced by social scientific theories and explanations 
                                         
9 Following Hedström and Ylikoski (2010), I think that Coleman can indeed be seen as an example of a mechanistic 
approach in sociology. 
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(Hacking 1995). Hence, ontological assumptions influence, at least to some degree, our sense 
making in social situations and, as a consequence, our actions. 
(b) The second example for ontological mopping-up-work is related to the former aspect: It is 
widely held (though not by everybody in the mechanist camp) that social mechanistic 
explanations are ipso facto micro-foundationalist. The now classic paper on mechanistic 
explanations by Machamer et al (2000), however, is much more liberal in this respect in that it 
states that higher-level entities are an essential explanatory part of mechanistic explanations. 
They are not just ‘short-cuts’ or ‘context’ but at the core of multilevel explanations. Why then is 
it the case that many social mechanists seem to think that the core of a social mechanism has 
to be spelled out in terms of interacting individuals whenever possible? Does this imply the 
existence of unreflected-upon foundationalist assumptions concerning social mechanisms? 
Could these inhibit social research as certain kinds of (possibly) explanatory macro-
mechanisms disappear form view due to taken-for-granted ontological assumptions (cf. 
Kaidesoja 2013)?  
One can, of course, choose not to think about these ontological issues, but the fact that one is 
not interested in the ontological aspects of the investigation does not mean that these aspects 
are not there; they just remain unexamined and in many cases unclear. Given the strong 
ontological flavour of mechanistic explanations, is seems inevitable to engage in these 
ontological issues – not as a foundation of mechanistic explanations, but as constructive and 
critical complement. Furthermore, the analysis of the ontological assumptions of (say) 
mechanistic explanations would make it possible to reveal the ways in which they guide 
research practices in the social sciences.10 What kinds of phenomena or activity patterns are 
(not) likely to become visible with ontological framework F? What are the differences between 
different ontological frameworks in this respect? 
In cases like these ((a) and (b)), ontological investigations in POSS primarily have a descriptive 
and clarificatory function. What kinds of relations and levels are assumed to exist? How are 
                                         
10 I owe this point to Brad Wray. 
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they related? What are the consequences of certain ontological assumptions? This seems to 
be a useful project in itself in that is helps to elucidate certain types of social explanations. 
However, in some cases ontological investigations of this kind may also have a normative 
component, namely whenever the philosophical (re-)description or clarification reveals 
inconsistencies in the ontological framework under consideration. In these cases, the purely 
descriptive approach might shift into the mode of ‘revisionary metaphysics’. This means 
reflecting on the question of what the relevant ontological assumptions should be in the 
respective explanatory framework. (This may sometimes turn into the contextual critique of the 
ontological assumptions in question, see above (1)) I think it is obvious that this kind of 
embedded critique has the potential to be highly useful for social scientific practice. 
 
(3) The critical analysis and comparison of different conceptions of ‘the social’ can illuminate 
deeper relationships between different explanatory frameworks and may thereby contribute to 
a clarifying systematization of the fragmented social sciences. 
As stated above, pluralism is not a deficiency of the social sciences. However, pluralism and 
fragmentation is not the same thing; and the social sciences, indeed, appear to be fragmented 
in different respects (Tang 2011) leading to a kind of pseudo-pluralism without much 
substantial inter-paradigmatic discourse or knowledge integration. One (though not the only 
one) of the major reasons for this situation is this. There exist many seemingly incompatible or 
at least very different conceptions of the central subject matter of the social sciences, i.e. ‘the 
social’, roughly pointing to such diverse things as wedding customs, gender roles, churches, 
bureaucracies, states, World War II and the occidental modernisation. There is no agreement 
concerning the intension or extension of these subconcepts across different paradigms or 
schools. Furthermore, there is no agreed-upon classification of social phenomena, say in 
institutions and organizations or in different types of social systems. The term ‘institution’, for 
example, is used interchangeably with ‘social structure’ by some social scientists, while 
sometimes it is used to denote patterns of behaviour or whole systems of rules and practices 
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(see Miller 2012 for some variants). This seems to be one of the reasons why social scientists 
using the same words are occasionally talking past each other. The two main reactions to this 
situation are: (a) indifference and (b) attempts to synthesize very different conceptions of ‘the 
social’ into one comprehensive conception (the classic example being Talcott Parsons, for 
recent integrations attempts see, e.g., Esser, 1993; Elder-Vass, 2007). 
I am quite sceptical towards the synthetic approach, however, as all attempts of paradigm 
integration until now have failed. So far, there is no widely accepted comprehensive paradigm 
(i.e. explanatory framework) and this is no accident. Attempts to synthesize different 
conceptions of ‘the social’ underestimate the differences between these conceptions in the 
social sciences and tend towards imperialistic assimilation instead of true integration. In 
addition these attempts are premature, as we lack a deeper understanding of the actual 
ontological assumptions of different explanatory frameworks and the deeper similarities, 
complementarities and incommensurabilities between them. At present, I think we don’t know 
whether different paradigms in the social sciences (e.g. Bourdieu’s Practice Theory; 
Luhmann’s Systems Theory) really have deep or even incommensurable ontological 
differences or whether they just highlight different aspects of the social, as Tang (2011) would 
suggest. It may turn out to be the case that many concepts of the social – apparently carving 
social reality at different joints – are, in the end, compatible, as the perceived differences are 
only shallow.  
To be sure, you can already find some framework comparisons in the social science literature, 
but, for the most part, these comparisons rely mainly on the (meta-)theoretical texts of the 
respective paradigms or school founders (see, e.g. López and Scott 2000). However, these 
‘grounding texts’ tend to overemphasize differences between different concepts of the social 
and, therefore, a comparison based on these texts risks buying into these overstatements. For 
this reason, a philosopher of the social sciences interested in comparing different conceptions 
of the social should not only rely on the (meta-)theoretical texts. She should also look for 
potential case studies in which an explanation of a given social phenomenon or regularity is 
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attempted within the explanatory framework F. In a second step, she would analyse the implicit 
ontological assumption made by F in this case and critically compare these with the explicitly 
stated assumptions to arrive at a somehow adjusted picture of the ontological assumptions of 
F. After having done this with different frameworks, she would have a better idea of the actual 
ontological assumptions of these frameworks and, therefore, would have a more reliable 
starting point for comparison between different paradigms. 
In this case, ontological investigations in POSS primarily have a clarificatory and systematizing 
function. What are the actual ontological demands on the world of different paradigms? Do 
they really differ that much in explanatory practice or are the supposedly deep differences only 
apparent? What are core differences and similarities? Critical and impartial investigations of 
the actual ontological assumptions regarding ‘the social’ (conducted by philosophers of the 
social sciences) could provide a partial remedy to the fragmentation of the social sciences and 
help us to understand how many different ontological playing pieces there really are. It may 
even be possible to create a kind of meta-framework for different core conceptions of the social 
that would enable meaningful comparison and could foster inter-paradigmatic discourse and a 
fruitful kind of pluralism instead of talking at cross-purposes. This would not only be interesting 
from a philosophical point of view but – again – would be useful for social scientists as well.  
There is even some concrete evidence that a project like this would be welcomed by social 
scientists. A group of prominent German sociologist recently published a working paper that 
made a similar case for the need of an impartial meta-framework for theory comparison and 
hinted at the possibility to base this framework on different core conceptions of ‘the social’ 
(Greshoff, Lindemann, and Schimank 2007). This very much looks like a job to which 
philosophers of the social sciences could – and should – contribute. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I attempted to show that ontological foundationalism as well as anti-ontological 
pragmatism are unsatisfactory: ontology is neither the foundation for the extension of social 
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scientific knowledge and explanatory strategies, nor are ontological questions irrelevant for the 
social sciences and social explanations. Rather, there are a number of different functions that 
ontological investigations in line with a philosophy of social science in practice perspective can 
have for the social sciences, namely (1) the restriction of ontological assumptions in light of the 
postulated explanatory approach, (2) the clarification of ontological assumptions in 
explanations, and (3) the illumination of relationships between different explanatory 
frameworks in the social sciences. Ontological investigations in these cases are deeply linked 
to epistemological issues in POSS and certainly can contribute to the advancement of the 
social sciences. Accordingly, I want to end this paper with a plea for more integration of 
explanatory and methodological work with ontological investigations in POSS – instead of 
doing either / or. 
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